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Abstract
It is frequently argued that the EU should speak with a single voice on the international stage in order to play an effec-
tive role in the ﬁeld of foreign policy. The representation of the EU by a single representative is often viewed as a rem-
edy to this lack of a single voice. This article analyzes that argument and asks whether the relative disillusionment that
followed the appointment of a president of the European Council and of a high representative of the EU suggests that
stronger EU representation on the world stage is needed. The article argues that equating the institutionalization of a
single representative with an ability on the part of the EU to speak with a single voice amounts to ‘magical thinking’
because no institutional engineering can overcome member states’ divisions. Furthermore, different successful cases of
external action led by a few member states in spite of the lack of unanimity show that the single voice is an unhelpful
myth. Lastly, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms reveals that the EU does not need stronger external rep-
resentation and that any principle of representation relying on personalization should be dismissed as inadequate in
the EU context.
Policy Implications
• The idea of a single voice as a necessary condition for EU foreign policy should be abandoned. The obsession with
consensus and apparent cohesion is unjustiﬁed and can even be harmful. Disagreements among member states
should not be considered a major hurdle to collective action because experience shows that they do not prevent
the effective external action of subgroups of member states.
• Institutional reforms aimed at ‘embodying’ the EU by giving it a face or representing it through charismatic leaders
are unsuited to the EU context. Collegial direction is preferable. No additional principle of external representation
should be introduced, although the principles of external representation as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty should
be clariﬁed.
• The democratic election of a president of the EU would add a new type of problem to existing ones, notably by
feeding populism and nationalism, impoverishing the political debate and weakening the EU’s unity.
It has become typical in political and academic circles to
fret about the EU’s lack of a single voice on the world
stage in matters of foreign policy. Critics regularly invoke
Henry Kissinger’s apocryphal statement,1 ‘who do I call if
I want to call Europe?’ Furthermore, practitioners and
scholars often claim that this lack of a single voice
amounts to a lack of visible representation of the EU on
the world stage. For this reason, they sometimes argue
that the representation of the EU by a single individual
would allow the EU to communicate a clear and uniﬁed
position. The creation of two external representative
positions – a high representative for foreign affairs and
security policy and a president of the European Council –
in the Lisbon Treaty has been presented as a remedy for
this supposed deﬁcit. This article aims to analyze the
argument according to which the appointment of a sin-
gle external representative would allow the EU to speak
with a single voice in matters of foreign policy. Moreover,
it asks how the EU should be represented on the interna-
tional stage by analyzing two possible forms of represen-
tation: on the one hand, does the relative public
disillusionment that followed the appointments of Cath-
erine Ashton and Herman Van Rompuy, who were sup-
posed to ‘embody’ the EU, imply that the EU should be
represented more strongly on the international stage? In
this respect, the most ambitious proposal is the demo-
cratic election of an EU president. On the other hand,
should we interpret this disillusionment as a sign that
the principle of the representation of the EU as a single
actor on the world stage should be abandoned?
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This article contends that the argument according to
which the appointment of a single representative would
allow the EU to speak with a single voice in matters of
foreign policy2 is less clear than it seems to be at ﬁrst
sight, and criticizes the assumptions on which it relies.
Furthermore, the article argues that while the necessity
of a single voice in foreign affairs has become a near-
unassailable myth, it is unnecessary – in part because
member states can provide for efﬁcient external actions,
even in the absence of a general agreement at the EU
level. As the pervasive divisions between member states
show, a representative who would convey the EU’s so-
called single voice would betray the EU rather than rep-
resent it: to recall a German pun, he or she would be a
Verr€ater [betrayer] rather than a Vertreter [representative].
For this reason, this article argues that the only viable
and sensible type of world-stage EU representative
would be not a charismatic leader but a mediator-infor-
mer of EU plurality.
The ﬁrst section of this article shows that the claim
that the institution of a single representative would allow
the EU to speak with a single voice amounts to magical
thinking. In addition, it argues that speaking with a single
voice is not even a requirement for efﬁcient external
actions. The second section examines the reforms intro-
duced by the Lisbon Treaty (i.e. the appointment of a
president of the Council and of a high representative of
the Union for foreign affairs and security policy) and their
effects. The third section argues that even if, in the wake
of the disenchantment that followed these reforms, one
believes that a more charismatic representation of the
EU would remedy its lack of visibility on the world stage,
there are several good reasons to oppose such institu-
tional reform, in particular the election of a president of
the EU. The conclusions contend that expectations about
the performance of a single EU representative should be
lowered drastically and dismiss as both unrealistic and
dangerous the assumption that the EU should speak with
a single voice in matters of foreign affairs.
Single representative, single voice: the
weaknesses of a common assumption
To recapitulate the expectation–capability gap paradigm
(Hill, 1993; see also Ginsberg, 1999), it is often believed
that the institution of a single representative would help
to reduce this gap by extending the capability of the EU
in matters of foreign policy. Independent of the legal
issues and ambiguities raised by the representation of
the EU globally, which we do not address here (for analy-
sis of this aspect see Dony (2009) and Wessel and Van
Vooren (2013)), the correlation between the institution of
a single representative and the ability of the EU to speak
with a single voice is not established; it relies, in fact, on
a confusion between representation as a procedure and
the possibility for the EU to ﬁnd general agreements and
uniﬁed positions. A representative of the EU would not
necessarily allow member states to ﬁnd such agreements.
The argument confuses formal representation and the
act of speaking with one voice in two distinct ways.
The single representative as an actualizer of the EU’s
single voice
On the one hand, the single-representative argument
could imply that the possibility of the EU speaking with
one voice exists already. An EU representative would
need only to communicate the EU’s ‘position’ on matters
of foreign policy (Lynch, 2005).3 However, this assump-
tion is of course na€ıve because it is obvious that in most
sectors – particularly when it comes to foreign policy –
there is no general agreement among member states, as
shown by the low legislative productivity in the sectors
in which unanimity (and not qualiﬁed majority voting) is
the rule. For instance, the recent crises in Libya, Mali and
the Central African Republic have revealed once again
the difﬁculties facing EU member states in ﬁnding com-
mon positions and deciding on joint action – all the
more so because such decisions had to be taken in a
context of emergency. To assume both that the ability to
speak with a single voice in foreign policy matters exists
and that we would only need a representative to make
good on this ability is to overlook the fact that the EU is
founded on a complex balance of power, with an institu-
tional design and decision-making processes that are
aimed at accommodating the diversity of member states’
positions and interests, and are certainly unable to
repress or overcome this diversity. Attempting to institu-
tionalize a single voice by assuming that a single repre-
sentative could actualize the EU’s single voice is
unrealistic.
The single representative as a magician: creating a
single voice from a plurality of voices
On the other hand, and more trickily and seriously, even
if we acknowledge the fact that the EU does not speak
with one voice, one might believe that the external rep-
resentation of the EU by a single actor would allow the
Union to ﬁnd common positions in the ﬁeld of foreign
policy.
This common argument is symptomatic of an exces-
sive conﬁdence in the power of institutions and institu-
tional reforms. Of course, institutions shape outcomes.
For instance, in matters of international trade, voting
rules determine the ability of member states to arrive at
a common position (Meunier, 2000). But it is also true
that in those ﬁelds member states, by pooling their
sovereignties, had previously agreed upon voting rules
that would help them to reach general agreements.
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When it comes to foreign-policy matters, the mere crea-
tion of a single representative cannot help to reduce dis-
agreements between member states. As Menon (2009)
correctly notes, ‘no amount of institutional tinkering can
circumvent the need for national governments to agree
in order that policies be adopted’ (quoted by Howorth
(2010), p. 456).
In fact, assuming a connection between the institution
of a single representative and the ability of the EU to
speak with a single voice amounts to magical thinking –
that is, to an erroneous conception of causality. In mat-
ters of foreign policy, member states cooperate if they
deem that it is in their interest, not because a president
urges them to do so (Zielonka, 2008, p. 73). Given the
plurality of member states’ legacies and the diversity of
their strategic interests abroad – in particular all member
states do not rely on the same type of energy resources,
the protection of which is a fundamental incentive to
intervene abroad – it is unlikely that common stances on
questions of foreign policy will be reached frequently. In
most international crises, member states have been
divided on the appropriate strategy to follow; these divi-
sions are so deep there is no reason to think that any
representative could overcome their cleavages. An EU
representative who would convey a single voice on the
world stage would more likely betray member states
than represent the EU as a whole.
To assume that the institution of a single representa-
tive would allow EU member states to ﬁnd common
positions in foreign affairs is to look at the problem
upside down. One has to consider to what extent the EU
is legally and politically able to act in the ﬁeld of foreign
policy to determine the most appropriate principle of EU
external representation. As the next section will argue,
the absence of general agreements among member
states has not prevented some EU member states from
jointly taking efﬁcient civilian actions, in the past and
more recently.
The unnecessary myth of the ‘single voice’
Occam’s razor would help to dismiss the notion of the
single voice as an unhelpful myth. The point is not to
argue that the EU should not be ambitious as a global
actor (on this aspect, see Howorth (2010) and Agh
(2012), for instance), but to acknowledge that the EU can
be present on the world stage in the absence of consen-
sus between its member states. The myth of the single
voice may originate in an erroneous conception of the
EU as a state (Telo, 2013, pp. 40–44). However, it is nec-
essary to devise instruments for foreign action that are a
pragmatic ﬁt with the EU’s original organization. Further-
more, from a normative point of view, displaying
unanimity is not even desirable when member states
have legitimate motives to disagree. There are several
reasons for which EU member states do not need to
reach unanimous positions in order to take external
action.
First of all, claiming that the EU can be present on the
world stage only when it has common positions is only
likely to lower its ability to take external action. Rather, it
is by not imposing this unanimity as a necessary condi-
tion for external action that the EU can become a more
efﬁcient global actor.
Second, as argued earlier, one should distinguish for-
mal representation and the problem of the EU’s single
voice, or lack thereof. For reasons of political communica-
tion, it is legitimate to appoint an EU representative who
is able to convey to external partners the different posi-
tions of EU member states, but it is unreasonable to
require that this representative should present to the
external partners only positions that are supported by all
member states. One might argue that the single-voice
narrative acts as an efﬁcient engine for further internal
unity (for an analysis of this function of foreign policy,
see Bickerton (2010)). One could also object that even if
no common position is realistic in the current state of
affairs, further unity within the EU in foreign affairs is still
desirable. However, even if the idea that consensus
should be a cornerstone of EU policies might have been
a powerful driver in the past, it is time to acknowledge
that apparent consensus at any price can have more
costs than beneﬁts.
Furthermore, a recent article by Gehring et al. (2013)
advances new evidence to show that what matters is not
how the EU is represented, but the ability of member
states to coordinate. Their research shows that the EU is
recognized as a relevant actor in international institutions
if it has the capacity to act – ‘action capability’, as the
authors term it – in the relevant domain of the interna-
tional institution. Interestingly, the EU can have formal
membership of an international institution but not be
recognized as a relevant actor because it lacks action
capability in the domain of the international institution
to which it belongs. This ﬁnding implies that when the
EU has real action capability in the domain of the institu-
tion to which it belongs, it is able to shape the political
debate and to inﬂuence the decision-making process.
But in the domains in which the EU has no real action
capability, it is not recognized as a relevant actor and
individual member states are listened to rather than the
representative of the EU – even if he or she ofﬁcially has
a right to speak for the EU. Therefore, they argue,
While the form of representation may have sym-
bolic or practical implications, it does not affect
the two main components of EU action capabil-
ity: autonomy in goal formation and control of
relevant governance resources [. . .] It is thus of
secondary importance whether the EU is repre-
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sented internationally by the Commission, the
Council Presidency or any other agent because
all EU representatives alike are bound to pursue
EU preferences that have been shaped accord-
ing to EU procedures (Gehring et al. (2013),
p. 853; for a similar view, see Kaczynski (2010),
p. 6).
In foreign policy, as in other ﬁelds, the EU’s ability to
be visible and active depends on its action capability,
which leads external partners to acknowledge it as a rel-
evant actor, and not on its representation.
The idea that we should focus on the actions the EU
actually takes rather than on it having a single voice is
strongly supported by Hartmut Mayer (2013) in a recent
analysis of the challenge of coherence in EU foreign pol-
icy (see also Mayer (2008)). In the single-voice narrative,
Mayer identiﬁes a ‘self-inﬂicted rhetorical trap’ (Mayer,
2013, p. 106).
Actually, recent history has shown that EU member
states can lead effective civilian action even if such
action is not supported by all the member states. David
Cadier (2011) showed that the EULEX mission in Kosovo
was rather successful in spite of the lack of unanimity
between member states. The reluctance of some mem-
ber states to commit to external operations does not pre-
vent successful action by the coalition of the willing – as
shown, for instance, by the Italy-led Alba operation (Zie-
lonka, 2008, pp. 66–67). Directoires of a few member
states can help to overcome the problem of unitary
action, as the EU-3’s dealing with Iran showed (Delcourt
and Remacle, 2009, p. 251).
External representation of the EU in practice
The disillusionment
This section focuses on formal representation by analyz-
ing the two new functions introduced by the Lisbon
Treaty: a European Council president and a high repre-
sentative of the Union for foreign affairs and security pol-
icy. It considers the implementation of these reforms and
focuses on the reasons why they have generally been
perceived as failures: do these failures imply that stron-
ger EU representation in foreign policy on the world
stage – that is, a more legitimate, more charismatic and
more powerful EU representative – is needed? Actually,
the public disenchantment that followed the appoint-
ments of Catherine Ashton as high representative and
Herman Van Rompuy as president of the European Coun-
cil should not be viewed as the result of their so-called
incompetence, lack of charisma or other individual short-
comings, a diagnosis that would necessitate the appoint-
ment of different leaders. The problem is not one of
personalities, but the inadequate assumption that the EU
should be charismatically embodied or personiﬁed in
order to play an active role on the world stage.
The reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty regarding
the representation of the EU in foreign policy were sup-
posed to confer more coherence to the position of the
EU in this ﬁeld. Instead, as Smith (2013) notes, they intro-
duced even more confusion, ﬁrst of all because the
Treaty does not stipulate clearly who, among the high
representative / vice president, president of the Council
and president of the Commission, is responsible for each
aspect of the EU’s external representation.4 While this
reform aimed in part at allowing the EU to speak with a
single voice, strangely it has led it to institutionalizing
three potential speakers.
As for the reform’s implementation, one needs only
allude to the criticisms that it triggered. Accounts of Ash-
ton and Van Rompuy’s early tenure suggest that their
ﬁrst months in ofﬁce were met with general disappoint-
ment. Journalists and public actors have tended to focus
excessively on the personalities of these actors, lambast-
ing their so-called incompetence or lack of charisma. It is
often argued, moreover, that they lack visibility and that
they have failed to represent the EU on the world stage.
What is striking is that political actors from the different
sides,5 Brussels practitioners and journalists all harshly
criticized the two representatives, sometimes even before
they had time to settle into their functions (see Juncos
and Pomorska (2013) and Quatremer (2009)), while even
academic literature criticized the work done by Ashton
(see, for instance, Smith (2013a, 2013b) and Howorth
(2011)). It is certainly rare that scholarly articles dwell on
the incompetence of speciﬁc individuals. How are we to
interpret the disenchantment that followed such much-
expected reform?
The reasons for the disillusionment
This disillusionment might be partly due to the process
through which Catherine Ashton and Herman Van
Rompuy were selected (for details see Barber (2010)
and Howorth (2011)). Both representatives were
appointed after a search for compromise, a method
that is used frequently in EU institutions. Searching for
compromise may be justiﬁed when it comes to decid-
ing upon public policies that will have to be imple-
mented across EU member states. But when high-level
representatives must be selected, the compromise
method is not appropriate because it leads to unsatis-
fying choices. Furthermore, the designation method
lacks the legitimacy that would be provided by a dem-
ocratic election.
This disillusionment could also be attributed to the
way Ashton in particular ﬁrst tackled her new job,
because criticism against Van Rompuy decreased after
his ﬁrst months in ofﬁce (Barber, 2010). Had another indi-
Global Policy (2014) 5:Suppl.1 © 2014 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Single Representative, Single Voice 71
vidual been appointed instead of Ashton, perhaps the
criticism would not have been so harsh. However, on a
deeper level, this episode shows that the so-often-wished
‘embodiment’ of the EU is certainly not a good ﬁt to this
political organization, for both structural and conjunctural
reasons. One might argue that the unfortunate turmoil
surrounding Ashton’s performance reveals that a stronger
external representation of the EU on the world stage is
needed. On the contrary, as the following section will
argue, this episode shows that any principle of represen-
tation relying on personalization is doomed to fail and
will entail counterproductive consequences.
Is stronger representation of the EU on the
world stage needed?
One could argue that the selection of a representative
lacking charisma – or so-called charisma – by the com-
promise method, and whom the Treaty of Lisbon has
provided with an ‘impossible job’ (Howorth, 2011,
p. 321), could only lead to disappointment and that by
ﬁghting the obvious shortcomings of this choice – i.e. by
electing a charismatic leader who to perform a more fea-
sible job (that is, one with more power) – one could pro-
vide the EU with the external representation it needs to
act as a global actor. In other words, the election of an
EU president could fulﬁl the hopes that triggered the Lis-
bon Treaty reforms. Does the EU need a stronger repre-
sentative – more charismatic, more legitimate and more
powerful?
First of all, as argued in the ﬁrst section, giving more
power to a representative of the EU in foreign policy
does not really make sense because any action in this
ﬁeld results from the addition of member states’ will,
which no one individual could force. Being granted
unprecedented functions, Ashton and Van Rompuy had
the opportunity to shape their jobs. Apparently, they
decided to act as ‘secretaries’ rather than leaders
(Howorth, 2011), at least partly because they lacked the
general support from member states that would have
allowed them to take bolder initiatives and assert their
authority more ﬁrmly.
As for the so-called lack of charisma and the weak
legitimacy plaguing the compromise method, let us
consider for a moment a recurrent idea: that of the
election of an EU president. This idea is regularly
advanced by politicians (for instance Merkel,6 Sch€auble,7
Blair8 and Kosciusko-Morizet9 ), federalists (Gozi, 2014)
and scholars (see Hix (2002), for instance), and seems to
be popular among EU citizens according to opinion
polls (see, for instance, Le Figaro (2012)). However, the
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty discussed earlier
reveals instead that such reform would create new
types of problems rather than solve the problem of EU
external representation.
One might claim that the compromise method is sub-
optimal and that an election would be more legitimate.
However, even if the current compromise method pre-
sents shortcomings, the democratic election of a presi-
dent of the EU is undesirable for several reasons. Indeed,
turnout for European elections is low and has decreased
continuously over the years. One cannot overlook the
possibility that voter turnout, even in the context of a
European presidential election, would also be low, seri-
ously compromising the legitimacy of an elected presi-
dent. In these conditions, the usual selection method of
compromise between member states might be more
legitimate than a ‘democratic’ election.
Second, even if turnout were high, the democratic
election of an EU president would not be desirable for
several reasons. In particular, a recent analysis of the
French presidential election by Brunet and Le Pillouer
(2011) and the general decay of this French institution
reveals ﬂaws that would likely appear in the context of a
European presidential election in an even more cruel
form than in the French context. Notably, the presidential
election monopolizes public attention and distracts from
real issues. It impoverishes the political debate by lead-
ing journalists to interpret the slightest political act in
terms of ‘will he or she be a candidate?’ and to a focus
on the features of individuals and small facts rather than
on political issues.
Furthermore, a presidential election would feed into
the myth of the providential leader, which unavoidably
leads to overinﬂated expectations and disappointment
on the part of citizens after the ﬁrst months of presiden-
tial tenure. Given the harsh criticism that followed Ash-
ton and Van Rompuy’s early tenures, one can easily
imagine how intense the negative reaction against an
elected EU president could be. In the EU’s case, the risk
of disenchantment is especially high given the strong
negativity bias of the media when reporting on EU-
related topics. Media bashing, already intense under Ash-
ton and Van Rompuy and also increasingly a characteris-
tic of French presidential tenures (see the mandates of
Sarkozy and Hollande), would likely worsen.
Clearly, when it comes to reforming EU institutions,
any institutional design should aim to reduce possible
sources of media bashing of representatives for three
major reasons: the media negativity bias mentioned ear-
lier, the prevalence of communication technologies that
foment this tendency and the current context of intellec-
tual and social crisis. The sometimes ridiculous but wide-
spread attacks against Ashton and Van Rompuy’s lack of
charisma show that a principle of representation relying
on personalization is inadequate in the EU context. An
excessive personalization of EU’s representation would
have no effect, or could even be hazardous. Let us
imagine that a leader considered ‘charismatic’ had been
appointed instead of Van Rompuy and Ashton: would
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this have changed the fact that EU foreign policy results
from the addition of member states’ will and that
nobody can overcome their divisions? And let us sup-
pose that a ‘charismatic’ and powerful president would
be elected by EU citizens: the focalization of public and
media attention on the (potential) candidates running for
the election would jeopardize the public debate – which,
it should be said, is ﬁnally nascent at the EU level in the
context of the crisis. At the other end of the spectrum, if
the elected person lacked charisma or was elected after
a low turnout, it would lead to harsh public criticism. In
both cases, focalization on an individual would be detri-
mental to the analysis of policy issues at the EU level,
where the political debate, rather than individuals, are
what really matter.
Lastly, if a presidential election were institutionalized,
the nationalisms inherent to the EU would pose a serious
hurdle. Even if they exist formally, political parties at the
EU level are in reality nearly nonexistent and the political
debate is still shaped at the domestic level. In this con-
text, it is very likely that citizens would determine their
vote not along political lines but along national lines.
This would seriously shake the fragile unity of the EU
and could even exacerbate nationalist tendencies.
Conclusions
Contrary to those who argue that the EU should be
‘embodied’ or should have a ‘face’ in order to act as a glo-
bal actor and reduce the democratic deﬁcit, this article
has argued that principles of representation relying on
personalization and considerations of charisma are inade-
quate in the EU context and would likely feed populism
and nationalism. Expectations about the performance of a
single EU representative should be lowered drastically. To
be clear, we believe that the EU needs to be externally
represented by individuals who are accountable to the
European Parliament. However, such representation is
desirable only if the representative holds no independent
power and serves strictly as a mediator, taking into
account the diversity of member states’ positions across
different political sectors. This function would provide the
formal guarantee that one could indeed ‘call Europe’ and
be informed of member states’ positions, while avoiding
the risks – populism, media bashing or the declaration of
a fake ‘single voice’ that would betray the EU’s diversity –
inherent to the representation of the EU by an elected
president.
The EU does not need stronger representation on the
world stage. The fact that external actions led by a few
member states were successful even if they were not
supported unanimously by the EU allows us to reject as
unnecessary the myth of the ‘single voice’, and to argue
in favour of a more modest principle of external repre-
sentation for the EU. What is important is to clarify the
principles of external EU representation by clarifying
which speciﬁc EU ‘capability’ is represented by whom,
among the president of the Council, the high representa-
tive and the president of the Commission, on the world
stage. This necessary clariﬁcation does not mean that tri-
ple representation should be dropped. This triple repre-
sentation is preferable in the EU context. More
fundamentally, the debate should focus on the EU’s
capabilities in the ﬁeld of foreign policy and on the type
of actions the EU can lead, rather than on its external
representation and perception by external partners. In
other words, what the EU does and can do in the ﬁeld of
foreign policy matters much more than what the EU is or
seems to be to external partners.
Notes
1. Actually, Kissinger is not sure he ever said this: http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/ap/2012-06-27/kissinger-says-calling-europe-quote-
not-likely-his.
2. For instance, after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, Dov
Lynch (2005) noted that ‘at best the EU voice is garbled; at worst,
it is not heard at all [. . .] The Constitutional Treaty would have
done a lot. It would have strengthened the Union’s foreign policy
by creating an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and a European
External Action Service. Bolstered by a dedicated service, the
new Minister would have presented a single face to the world
and conveyed a single voice for EU foreign policy’ (p. 11). The
reform was ﬁnally adopted but did not seem to have the
expected consequences, as the second section shows.
3. ‘Ironically, one of van Rompuy’s expected functions was to
embody the ‘single voice’ with which the EU might speak to the
world’ Howorth (2011), p. 313.
4. ‘Although the HR is supposed to replace the holder of the
rotating EU Presidency as the main driver of CFSP/CSDP affairs
(Title V, Art. 18), he/she still must compete with the new posi-
tion of the President of the European Council, who is charged
with ensuring the ‘external representation’ of the Union on
issues concerning the CFSP (Title III, Art. 15 (6)), as well as the
Commission President, who still retains considerable authority
over most economic-related aspects of EFP and ‘ensures the
EU’s external representation’ over non-CFSP foreign affairs mat-
ters (Title III, Art. 17). These two ‘presidential’ EU actors, further;
hold a higher diplomatic status relative to the HR (as full mem-
bers of the European Council); therefore they can easily usurp
the HR’s authority in day-to-day decision making. They are also
charged with ensuring the overall consistency of the EU’s exter-
nal actions and other policies (Title V, Art. 21 (3))’ (Smith, 2013,
p. 1303).
5. For instance, Franziska Brantner, from the German Green Party,
declared after Ashton’s hearing: ‘her hearing has revealed no
clear sense of vision, no initiatives and no plans of her own.
We’re buying a pig in a poke’ (http://greens-efa-service.org/me-
dialib/mcinfo/pub/en/scc/1424; see also Chafﬁn (2011)). Or the
shocking verbal attacks on Hermann Van Rompuy made by Nigel
Farage: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJHETdxwv8Y.
6. See Lema^ıtre (2011).
7. See Die Zeit(2011).
8. See Hall (2012).
9. See Atlantico(2012).
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